DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUC

SECRET
(Security Classification)

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO. April 23, 1955

DEPARTMENT OF STATE COPY AUTHORIZED BY CDC/MR

SUBJECT: Enlisting Support for U. S. Policies Toward Taiwan

REVIEWED BY [illegible] DATE 2/9/82

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
AUTH REASON(S)
PURPOSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑
RELEASE DENIED ☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

611.93/4-2355
CS/R 5/4-2355
CS/R 6/14/93

This Document Must Be Returned to Files

TO: ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

Pyramiding Chinese Communist aggression and the diplomatic offensive pressed vigorously by Peiping since Geneva have drawn world attention to China. The policy of the United States, the greatest Pacific power, towards China is being watched anxiously and critically by people everywhere, most of whom know little of China or United States policies in that area, or whose vision is clouded by their natural fear of war. It is important for American representatives abroad, in whatever official capacity, to familiarize themselves with our policy toward China and with its background, and to use this knowledge to gain for our policies the understanding and support of the foreign officials with whom they come in contact. Such support is necessary if the free world is to have the unity and determination to call a halt to Communist aggression in Asia. Succeeding portions of this instruction are to be made available to the officers of the Foreign Service and of other establishments abroad for this purpose.

The United States intends to keep Taiwan and Penghu in friendly hands, even at the risk of war. The United States intends to continue its support of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), giving it continued military and economic aid, and assisting it to gain and retain prestige in international bodies and in its foreign relations, particularly in Asia. The United States intends to continue to develop, enhance, and conserve the potential military usefulness to the free world of the GRC and the territory it controls, and to heighten the political value of the GRC as an alternative to the Communist regime.

Taiwan is a non-negotiable subject because of its strategic importance in the event of war and as a source of intelligence, and because of the potential military and political usefulness of the GRC which is essential to the free world. The United States intends to avoid not only actual compromises on this issue, but also any public discussion of compromise proposals; for such discussion might itself cause serious damage to the morale and effectiveness of the GRC.

Our allies

1 copy (APEC) Reproduced for CA - Miss K. F. Mack #1A Copy 11/14/55 AMA Correction by [illegible]

SECRET
(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: FE:CA:DLGoodrum:apt:geb 1/21/55
APPROVED BY: CA - Walter P. McConaughy

CLEARANCES:
FE - Mr. Sebald
WJS - by WPMcC
S/S-CR
APR 22 2 PM

SECRET
(Security Classification)

[redacted]

Our allies should be encouraged to accept the strategic importance of Taiwan and Penghu to the free world. This should be conveyed against a background of the fundamental hostility of Communist China to the free world. Also, non-Communist countries should be encouraged to extend sympathy and support of the GRC, and promote conditions which will assist inclusion of the GRC in Western Pacific collective defense arrangements and Far East economic groupings as may be organized among the free nations of Asia.

The foregoing statements on United States objectives are in complete conformance with approved national policies. Diplomatic and consular officers in their contacts with local officials, should seize every opportunity to counteract some of the misapprehensions widely held regarding the United States China policy and promote broader understanding of and support for United States policies. This instruction is intended to provide guidance for officers in discussing the Taiwan issue with local contacts and in using such discussions as a means of promoting acceptance of United States policy.

3701

[redacted]

SECRET
(Security Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

The Defensive Evolution of United States Policy

The evolution of United States policy shows its wholly defensive character most clearly. Each major policy step has followed a Communist hostile act.

Before the outbreak of war in Korea, the United States had adopted a hands-off stand in regard to the struggle between the GRC and the Chinese Communists. The United States kept its Mainland diplomatic and consular posts open after the Communist takeover until Chinese Communist interference, intimidation, and maltreatment forced their closure in the spring of 1950. President Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet of June 27, 1950 directing it to guard Taiwan and see that the Nationalists stopped air and sea operations against the Mainland, came only after North Korea had launched its attack. It was a necessary measure designed to protect the flank of United Nations forces in Korea. On September 21, 1950 the United States proposed that the UNGA study and make recommendations on the problem of the future of Taiwan. The massive intervention of Chinese Communist armed forces in Korea caused the United States to drop the proposal. (Since the exposure of the aggressive nature of the Chinese Communist regime through its intervention in Korea the United States has strongly opposed UN consideration of the status of Taiwan.)

Military assistance to the GRC on Taiwan was not begun until several months after Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The agreement on military assistance (the exchange of notes of January 30 and February 9, 1951) includes a GRC promise to use material supplied only "to maintain its internal security or its legitimate self-defense." A small Military Assistance Advisory Group on Taiwan was established in May 1951.

President Eisenhower's modification of the order to the Seventh Fleet, removing the prohibition on GRC operations against the Mainland, came on February 2, 1953, after the Chinese Communists' violent rejection (December 14, 1952) of an Indian proposal in the UN for a Korea Armistice had threatened to prolong the war indefinitely. Two months after the modification of the Seventh Fleet order, the Communists accepted essentially this Indian formula.

In July 1954 Peiping launched a massive "liberate Taiwan" propaganda campaign. The September 3 shelling of Quemoy was the heaviest attack on GRC territory in five years. The attacks spread to other islands. A concurrent propaganda campaign on "US espionage" was climaxed November 23 by the sentencing of 13 Americans, including 11 UNC airmen detained in violation of the Korean Armistice. Against this background of mounting Chinese Communist belligerency, the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, December 2, 1954.

Despite the Treaty's defensive character, Chou-En-lai denounced it as a "grave, warlike provocation". In January the Chinese Communists launched the heaviest

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

heaviest air bombardment of their history on the Tachens. On January 18-20, they seized Ichiang Island, proclaiming that this was a step toward the eventual seizure of Taiwan. This intensification of Chinese Communist hostilities led to the joint Congressional Resolution (introduced January 24, passed January 29).

The only exercise so far of the authority under the joint resolution has been in assisting the GRC to evacuate the Tachens in early February.

The same week that the Resolution was passed, the United States supported a New Zealand initiative in the UN for Security Council consideration of the question of ending offshore island hostilities. The Chinese Communists flatly rejected an invitation to participate in the UNSC discussions, and continued to proclaim intention to seize Taiwan by force.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

GROUNDS FOR FIRMNESS IN OUR POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN [redacted]

Usefulness of the GRC to the Free World

The importance to the Free World of the GRC and its armed forces derives not only from the circumstance that the GRC occupies the important strategic base of Taiwan, but even more from the GRC's positive political and military potential. Withdrawal of support from the GRC would, by alienating that Government and injuring its morale, seriously reduce and probably destroy both its military and its political potential.

1. GRC armed forces are one of the two most significant concentrations of anti-Communist Asian military strength in the Far East.

2. Politically, the GRC presents a challenge to Communist domination of the Asian mainland and to Communist control of the thirteen million overseas Chinese.

   a. A non-Communist alternative to the Peiping regime would be invaluable if the Communists launch a major war, and is of considerable value in peacetime, as a political focus for the loyalties of disaffected mainland elements, and deterrent against Chinese Communist aggression in Asia.

   b. Assimilation by host countries of Chinese minorities is a worthy goal, and one which is in entire accord with United States policy; but for the immediate future most overseas Chinese will retain some degree of loyalty to China. The GRC, to the extent that it provides an alternative focus for the external loyalty of overseas Chinese, will help to prevent Communist subversion of very important population groups in Southeast Asia.

3. In the United Nations, the GRC supports the Free World stand and helps to prevent the Communist bloc from increasing its influence. Apart from the great prestige gain to Communist China that would come from UN membership, a Red Chinese delegate would use his influence and his vote for purposes destructive of UN Charter principles. Red China's weight cast against collective security, against constructive economic and social measures would in many instances have a disastrous effect. Further, the meeting places and corridors of the UN would be used by Red China as fields for pressing her diplomatic offensive.

Inherent

[redacted]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

Inherent Validity of GRC's Claims

It is thus clearly desirable from the point of view of Free World self-interest that the GRC be sustained in its opposition to Communism. Free World policies designed to achieve these objectives are also justifiable, in the light of the GRC's claims to be the lawful Government of China and to the right to represent China in the UN.

1. The GRC's claim to be the only lawful Government of China is based on the incontrovertible fact of its continued functioning without interruption since it first won international recognition.

2. The GRC's claim to sovereignty over all China rests not only on this but also on the following:

   a. Continued control over a part of the territory which it claims.

   b. Continuing fulfillment of China's international obligations in a manner that is highly creditable.

   c. Its claims to the loyalty of a majority of all Chinese. These claims are given considerable credibility by the choice recently made by Chinese POW's in Korea (three out of four for Free China) and the 17,000 civilian residents of the Tachen Islands, virtually all of whom chose to go to Taiwan, in a choice which was acknowledged to be free by foreign as well as Chinese observers.

3. The GRC's right to represent China in the United Nations is based not only on the foregoing considerations but also on the fact that of the two claimants for China's UN seat, only the GRC has demonstrated the following qualifications:

   a. Support of the Charter principles. The GRC adhered to the United Nations Charter Agreement at San Francisco and has continually since that time supported the principles of the Charter in international questions.

   b. Opposition to aggression. The GRC has consistently supported action in and by the UN against aggression, whereas the opposing claimant is a condemned aggressor.

   c. Acknowledgement of international obligations. The GRC has tried to meet its financial and other obligations to the United Nations.

   d. Adherence to accepted standards of international conduct in its foreign

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

foreign relations and its treatment of foreign nationals and property.

Compatibility with Precedent

Continued Free World recognition and support of the GRC is entirely compatible with accepted international practice and historical precedent. There is ample precedent for nations offering moral and material support to friendly governments threatened by overthrow from without and within, especially when the contrary forces have avowed hostility towards the supporting nations. Support in such cases is not customarily withdrawn so long as the threatened friendly government retains the concrete attributes of sovereignty which are possessed by the GRC. The withdrawal of support from a nation which was a staunch ally in wartime would be particularly unjustifiable.

Opposition of Taiwan Population to Communism

The United States refusal to consider "bargaining away" Taiwan is conditioned also by a respect for the wishes of the people of Taiwan and Penghu. While there has in the past been considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the indigenous population, arising primarily out of the maladministration of the first postwar Governor of Taiwan, together with the economic dislocations attendant upon the influx of a huge refugee population from the mainland, this dissatisfaction is steadily being reduced, and in any case has never occasioned any significant sentiment for Communism. The "mainlanders" would never had come to Taiwan had they been reconcilable to Communism. Some 14,000 former prisoners of war from Korea chose separation from home and family in order to come to Free China. The war in Korea lasted a year longer for the sake of the voluntary repatriation principle; we owe it to ourselves as well as the men to spare them from Communist retribution. Not only these, but also the indigenous Taiwanese are overwhelmingly anti-Communist, as has been attested by a host of independent observers. Multiple-slate, secret ballot elections have been held throughout Taiwan, and these would have afforded opportuhity for an indication of discontent with the non-Communist form of government, had there been any. No such indications have been forthcoming.

Under these circumstances, the negotiation of any settlement involving cession of Taiwan to Communist China would represent very nearly 10,000,000 individual tragedies.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

COMMUNIST CHINA AS A THREAT TO ASIA

UNCLASSIFIED

General

Although the Chinese Communists have modified their tactics from time to time, they have never abandoned their ultimate objectives -- the establishment of "socialism" in China and the promotion of the world communist revolution. In internal politics, the Chinese Communists have, when expedient, accommodated those whom they regarded as their enemies (such as the landlords and the middle classes), but when the support of these and other groups was no longer required, Peiping gave the order for their liquidation, imprisonment or ruin.

In international politics, the Chinese Communists have followed the same general plan of battle. Countries like India and Burma which were once described by Peiping as "semi-colonial" states, still awaiting liberation, are now called independent, "peace-loving" states and are the objects of the most tender attention from the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists now stress the themes of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in order to lull them into a false sense of security, to turn them against the United States, and to dissuade them from taking adequate measures for self-defanse. At the same time, Peiping is covertly preparing for the day when communist parties in these and other nations might make a successful bid for power. When and if that day arrives, communists in various parts of Asia know they will be assured of Chinese Communist support on a much larger scale than it now is being tendered. And that support will be backed by the largest and most powerful military establishment in Asia.

Chinese Communist Penetration of Peripheral Areas

From Ladakh on the Tibet-Sinkiang border to Korea, the Chinese Communists have been active in expanding their influence and attempting to undermine local governments. At times Chinese Communist interference has taken the form of covert infiltration and attempted subversion; at times it has involved the use of military force, economic penetration or other means calculated to advance the prospects of a world communist revolution. Recently, Peiping has curtailed some of its activities to make them consistent to a certain degree with its current peace offensive. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Communist China has actually discarded the technique of subversion.

Peiping's military intervention in North Korea is too well-known to require extensive documentation. It is sufficient to note in passing that there are still large numbers of Chinese Communist troops in Korea, that Peiping is giving economic and technical assistance to North Korea and that the foregoing factors will assist Chinese Communist penetration and control.

Intervention

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

Intervention by the Chinese Communists in Vietnam is also an indisputable fact. Ever since the Vietminh occupied Cachang and Langson in 1950, they have benefitted from Chinese Communist technical and military assistance and have received substantial supplies of war equipment. They are now the recipients of economic aid, as well as technical advice and advisors, and Peiping was active in reconstructing the Chennankuan-Hanoi Railway.

With reference to Laos and Cambodia, the Chinese Communists may be expected to use the Pathet Lao, the Vietminh and other communist groups as agents to further their program. The illegal seizure of the two northern Laotian provinces by the Pathet Lao and the recent entry into Laos of a Vietminh battalion -- in contravention of the Geneva Agreement -- are examples of communist tactics in the area.

Chinese Communist pressure against Thailand has mainly been in the form of threats, the use of Overseas Chinese as agents, and the grooming of former Prime Minister Pridi as a possible rallying point for Thai communists and dissidents. The "Thai Autonomous Area" in south Yunnan may eventually be used as the base for a pan-Thai communist movement.

During the past few months, the Chinese Communists have been making a strong effort -- with some results -- to curry the favor of India and Burma and to encourage their neutralism. This has made it difficult for Peiping to give overt support to local communists, but connections with the people along the border have been maintained and strengthened and Chinese Communist troops have entered and remained in parts of Burma claimed by both Burma and China. Funds and training have been furnished to certain Burmese guerrilla leaders, and at least one Indian Kachin, but Peiping has been circumspect in the matter of furnishing such assistance.

There is the possibility that the Nepalese Communists may eventually turn to Peiping for guidance, and the Chinese Communists hold a potential puppet in Dr. K. I. Singh who may have a substantial following in West Nepal. It is anticipated that Chinese Communist pressure on the Indian borders and the border states will tend to increase, mainly because of improved communications. The peoples along the border are closely related to groups under Chinese control, ~~and they are,~~ in general, anti-Indian or anti-Burmese, as the case may be.

Chinese Communist use of Overseas Chinese as a pressure group is probably best illustrated in Malaya where most of the communist guerrillas, as well as the people who support them, are Chinese. This does not mean that all Chinese in Southeast Asia support Peiping. Only a small minority do, but most of the rest are neutral and are carefully watching to see what will happen.

Japan

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

Japan is another country which has occupied the attention of Peiping. It appears that Moscow is still responsible for overall direction of the Communist Party of Japan, but the Chinese Communists have been of assistance in matters relating to tactics, financial assistance, training and asylum for Japanese Communist leaders. Peiping has also applied propaganda pressure against the Japanese on occasion but is now concentrating on wooing the Japanese, using increased trade as the main bait.

Chinese Communist Military Forces

It is probable that there are over 2,000,000 men in the Chinese Communist field forces. There are also some 1,000,000 men in the Public Security Forces, who have all received military training, are armed with light weapons and can be rapidly integrated into the regular field forces. In addition there are militia forces estimated variously to include some 6,000,000 to 10,000,000 persons. Most of the members of the militia are not armed and have not received any training, many are over-age and others have physical defects, but there is a certain proportion of men and women between the ages of 18 and 35 who have had some training and could be brought into the regular army. A law providing for compulsory military service has been proposed and suggests the armed forces may be augmented in the future. Under the provisions of this law 459,000 new men will be brought into the army by March 1955 but some may be replacements for discharged personnel. There is also a new provision for the recruitment and training of a permanent officer corps -- something unprecedented in Chinese Communist military history.

The Chinese Communist Air Force has an estimated 2,000 aircraft of which approximately 1,600 are combat types ranging from piston-engine fighters and bombers to jet fighters and bombers of very recent Soviet design.

Although small, the Chinese Communist Navy is being steadily strengthened and probably has some Soviet-type submarines at its disposal.

Ever since the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean War, they have made steady progress in improving their armed forces by more effective training, imports of modern and relatively modern military equipment from the USSR, increased capability for producing war material in China proper, standardization of weapons and the development of an airforce. All available information indicates that Peiping will continue to increase the size and improve the efficiency of its military forces, thus not only assuring its position as the dominant Asian Power in terms of military strength but also widening the already enormous gap between Communist China and other Asian nations in this respect. In this connection it would seem pertinent to note that Peiping's protestations of friendly intent, desire for peaceful coexistence and subscription to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are belied by Chinese Communist preparations for war and aggression.

Totalitarianism

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

Totalitarianism in Communist China

The main features of the Soviet-type authoritarian administration established by the Chinese Communists are: (1) a unitary territorial structure with direct lines of command down to the provinces, counties, villages and "autonomous minority areas"; (2) a distinction between "constitutional" and "private" sectors of activity, the former "administered" by a formal government and the latter "mobilized" by approximately 90 mass organizations embracing more than 200,000,000 people; (3) the integration of the various chains and layers of command by a "non-official" elite, the Communist Party; (4) a structure of inspection, surveillance and coercion embodied in the public security forces, local constabulary, the army and militia, "public security committees", and a host of informal associations; and, (5) the development of a system of persuasion, involving the use of legal, economic, social and psychological pressures and the operations of an extensive and highly-coordinated propaganda apparatus.

The drive toward centralization, which has proceeded over a period of years, has been accompanied by systematic use of terror, persuasion and coercion by the Communists in order to maintain themselves in power. In the villages the "peasants associations" and militia groups under the direction of communist adherents are used to keep the farmers under constant scrutiny and control. In the country, as in the cities, children are encouraged to inform on their parents and neighbor on neighbor. At the hsien or county level there are small detachments of public security troops who investigate the more serious crimes in the countryside. In the cities, there are street and lane associations, regular and public security police, labor groups and other organizations to keep the people under constant surveillance. Denunciation for "counter-revolutionary" activities is encouraged and one misstep or an unguarded word may entail fatal consequences. Virtually no one in Communist China is safe from possible police investigation and action. By the above means and the imposition of harsh punishment, Peiping retains its grip over the people, and since Chinese Communist law also deals retroactively with "crimes" committed in the past, not even a person who has accommodated himself to communist rule is safe from the courts.

The landlords of China were the first to feel the harsh hand of Peiping justice during the land reform movement. Virtually all of them were killed, imprisoned or reduced to beggary; this punishment was frequently extended to their families. These people were persecuted as a class, with but little reference to their past activities; the good suffered with the bad and the common peasants were forced, even if unwilling, to participate in this bloody episode under threat of like treatment.

The

DECLASSIFIED

The middle-classes continued in relative tranquility until the "five-anti" movement of 1951 when almost every merchant was charged with tax evasion, corruption of officials, cheating the government or other crimes and assessed heavy fines. During this period there were many suicides and more bankruptcies. The "five-anti" movement might be interpreted as a large-scale capital levy, and it brought untold misery to many people in Communist China.

Government officials, including former Nationalist officials and some members of the Communist Party, were affected by the "three-anti" movement which took place concurrently with the "five-anti". Many were discharged, some were deleted from Party rolls, others were sentenced to "reform through labor".

The campaign against "counter-revolutionaries" in China began in 1950 but definitive regulations did not appear until February 1951. Under these regulations almost any action which by any stretch of the imagination might be considered harmful to Peiping was decreed a crime. Unknown numbers of persons have been prosecuted under these regulations and it is estimated that from 400,000 to 1,200,000 have been sentenced to "reform through labor" -- a form of forced labor -- in addition to those imprisoned or executed, whose number is not known.

Recently, the Chinese Communists initiated a party unity drive and have again given much attention to counter-revolutionary activity, the latter sometimes including such things as an "improper attitude" toward production and other tenuous offenses, hard to prove but easy to punish. It is to be expected that there will be additional victims in the Party and elsewhere as the result of these drives -- not counting, of course, alleged American spies captured and used as examples for the people.

Chinese Communist treatment of foreign nationals has been harsh and arbitrary. Some foreigners have been imprisoned on specious grounds, kept in confinement for long periods, tortured and sometimes have died as the result of the treatment they received. Foreign businessmen have seen their property confiscated, have been forced to pay enormous fines for "malpractice" or "tax-evasion", and have been held for ransom by their Chinese captors.

In general, it may be expected that Peiping will continue to use police methods to retain its hold over the people of China. There are some indications that these methods may be modified with time, but they will continue to be applied vigorously and without mercy when needed. At the same time, Peiping will push its plans for a more centralized authority as a means of strengthening its control in China.

The

UNCLASSIFIED

The Communist Party, which has recently been "purified" and apparently has also expanded its membership to a considerable degree (although no figures are given), will be used as a coordinating and integrating instrument. The future of much of its membership is dependent on the continuation of the present administration, and it can be trusted to carry out the orders and policies of Peiping. The Party holds only one third of the seats in the National People's Congress, but the control of its top officials over the Congress is absolute and the Congress, during its recent session, acted as a rubber stamp in approving the decisions of the leadership. The Party, after all, controls all of the organs of persuasion, coercion and punishment which exist in the country, so the role assigned to other parties, whose survival preserves some semblance of "democracy", is clear and those parties do not dare attempt any deviations.

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

Who is the Aggressor Against China?

UNCLASSIFIED

Problem

Communist propaganda charges the United States with "detaching" Taiwan from China, with thus violating the Cairo Declaration, and with "occupying", "invading" or "seizing" Taiwan. Response to accusations of this sort should not only refute the charges, but also focus attention on actual Soviet encroachments upon China's territorial integrity.

The Status of Taiwan

The Cairo Declaration, reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration, declared that it was the purpose of the Allies to restore Taiwan and Penghu to the Republic of China. The GRC has been in control of Taiwan ever since 1945, when, in accordance with General Order No. 1 of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese forces on Taiwan surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang. Japan formally renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and Penghu in the Japanese Peace Treaty, which renunciation was reaffirmed in the bilateral Treaty of Peace between Japan and the GRC. However, there has been no formal act of cession or other international legal act giving China sovereignty over Taiwan or Penghu. It is recognized by both the GRC and the United States that the absence of such a formal act of cession has created unresolved technical questions as to Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu. However, the United States, while taking account of these questions does not base its policy towards the GRC or Taiwan on the "special" status of these islands, nor does the United States dispute the right of the GRC to occupy, administer, and control Taiwan and Penghu.

The Mutual Defense Treaty

It has been United States policy ever since 1950 to prevent the occupation of Taiwan and Penghu by the Chinese Communists. This policy, originally based on a unilateral decision taken in the context of the war in Korea, has now been given the formal character of a bilateral commitment by the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (signed December 2, 1954, ratified February 11, 1955, entered into force March 3, 1955). The Treaty is entirely defensive in character and is comparable in detail with our other collective security arrangements in the Pacific. It is consistent in every respect with our United Nations obligations. Finally, as is made absolutely clear in the notes exchanged December 10, 1954, the treaty does not and cannot commit the United States to any action, or to support of or acquiescence in any action, of an offensive character.

Joint

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Joint Congressional Resolution on Taiwan

Public Law 4 (House Joint Resolution 159), authorizing the President to "employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack" became necessary because of greatly heightened Chinese Communist belligerency and intensified warlike acts against the offshore islands held by GRC forces. These acts, including the serial bombardment of GRC positions, the sinking of GRC ships, and the actual invasion of some positions, were accompanied by Communist pronouncements indicating that the acts were part of or preliminary to an assault on Taiwan itself. While the United States neither is nor has been committed to the defense of the offshore islands as such, we could not ignore the Chinese Communist threats without the danger that the Chinese Communists might be serious and might, through miscalculation of their own capabilities and our intentions, take some step leading to war. This was particularly so inasmuch as some of the offshore islands, notably Quemoy (which is in a position to control Amoy Harbor) and Matsu (opposite Foochow), are clearly related to the defense of Taiwan. So long as the Chinese Communists themselves retain their determination to seize Taiwan and Penghu by force, the need for the authority accorded the President by Public Law 4 will continue.

The same week that the Joint Resolution was voted, the United States gave its public support to the New Zealand initiative for Security Council consideration looking towards a cessation of hostilities in the offshore islands area. The Chinese Communists summarily rejected the invitation that was extended them to participate in the proposed discussions. When the Tachens were evacuated in early February (first exercise and the only one so far of the authority accorded the President by Public Law 4), the Chinese Communists called their occupation of the Tachens a step toward seizure of Taiwan.

Soviet Actions Infringing Upon Chinese Sovereignty

In contrast to the consistent adherence of the United States to the letter and spirit of its declaration and agreements, the USSR's violation of its agreements and perversion of the sense of its declarations has been consistent and notorious. Specifically, with reference to agreements and declarations pertaining to China's territorial integrity, the Soviet record is demonstrable.

1. The

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

1. The Cairo Declaration stated that Manchuria should be restored to the Republic of China. This declaration was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration, which was adhered to by the USSR. In a Resolution adopted on February 1, 1952, the General Assembly of the United Nations found "that the USSR obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China in reestablishing Chinese national authority in the three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria)."

2. Soviet failure to carry out the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 14, 1945 was established by the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of February 1, 1952 (cited above).

3. Soviet violation of the Agreement concerning Dairen, entered into with the GRC pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, is well known. Under that agreement, Dairen was to be a "free port, open to the commerce and shipping of all nations". Soviet actions have notoriously obstructed the free use of the port of Dairen. The Sino-Soviet accords of October 12, 1954 failed to mention Dairen.

4. With the connivance of the Chinese Communists, the USSR has succeeded in establishing in China the special position and the "spheres of influence" whose creation was the goal of the Far Eastern policies of Tsarist Russia. Outer Mongolia has been detached from China, the USSR's special position in respect to key transportation and industrial facilities in Manchuria and Sinkiang is acquiesced in by the Chinese Communists; although the Sino-Soviet accords of October 12, 1954 did away with some of the overt apparatus in the form of the "joint stock companies", a substantial control mechanism in the form of ubiquitous Soviet "advisers" remains untouched.

5. The reestablishment by the USSR of Tsarist Russia's imperialistic "spheres of influence" and "special positions" has been in contravention of agreements between the USSR and the GRC pursuant to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. Soviet respect for full Chinese sovereignty in the control of all Manchuria, for example, was pledged in (a) the

Exchange

Exchange of Notes relating to the Treaty of August 14, 1945, and (b) the Agreement concerning Dairen. These, of course, were agreements with the GRC; however, even the Communist regime has fared little better at Soviet hands. Soviet "special rights" in Manchuria were continued after the Soviet-Chinese Communist Treaty of Alliance of February 14, 1950. Belatedly, on October 12, 1954, the two Communist regimes announced that Soviet armed forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur by May 31, 1955. However, the wording of the Sino-Soviet communique is ambiguous, and leaves open the possibility that the Soviets may continue to enjoy "joint use" of the Naval base at Port Arthur.

DECLASSIFIED